Historically, Russia sanctions bills in the U.S. Congress have been bipartisan, popular, and quick to garner easy – indeed, overwhelming - approval almost as soon as Washington begins buzzing about them. You blink, and suddenly Congress has codified sanctions against Russia.
And here we are again, with a new Russia sanctions bill suddenly lurching forward – yet this time with Constitutional and economic consequences. With tariffs raining down on all sides as an empowered Executive Branch has homed in on tariffs as its preferred economic weapon of choice, the latest Russia sanctions bill carries not only an intended punch to Russia’s energy economy, it also opens a new pandora’s box on tariff authority and affordability questions.
The bill, initially authored by the late fierce Russia critic and ardent Ukraine supporter Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), shot onto DC’s radar after the Senator’s last visit to Ukraine. It allows for new sanctions against Russia and, additionally, steep tariffs against U.S. trading partners. Depending on how the tariffs against trading partners are implemented, the result would be yet another opportunity to raise costs for American workers and families.
A bipartisan coalition of 62 Senators as of this writing – including Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) - support the “Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026” (S.5025), which has been referred solely to the Senate Banking Committee. A companion measure sponsored by Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX) is expected to emerge[1], and this may allay Democrats’ concerns regarding the bill’s tariff authorities. If it does not, support may splinter. With Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Washington for Senator Graham’s funeral and a White House meeting, there may be sufficient political will to push a bill towards passage.
Breaking New Ground with Sanctions and Tariffs
It has been some time since Congress moved Russia sanctions legislation. The potential codification of numerous new and important sanctions – albeit subject to Presidential waivers – can be seen as mere messaging to Russia and Ukraine about a desire to see an end to the war, but it can also be seen as indication that Congress still believes it may be able to change President Putin’s behavior by hitting Russia’s finances and limiting Russia’s access to energy revenue.
Tariff Provisions. Senate sponsors are rallying around tariff language that represents a bold leap in ceding of Constitutional tariff authority to the President, and this is the concern that Rep. McCaul seems poised to address.
Specifically, citing no existing trade statute, Section 113 of S. 5025 would allow the President to apply tariffs of up to 100% against countries that:
Knowingly made new purchase of crude oil or natural gas from Russia starting 30 days after the bill’s enactment.
Were among the top 5 largest importers of Russian oil by volume in the last 12 months.
Were among the top 5 largest importers of Russian natural gas by volume in the last 12 months (however, countries accounting for less than 15% of Russia’s total natural gas exports or that have taken “significant steps” to reduce Russian natural gas imports would be exempted); and
Were among the top 5 countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion – which as defined in the bill would include significant financial support for purchase, loading, or shipment of sanctioned Russian oil and engaging in any transaction, activity or service related to a shadow fleet vessel that transported, is transporting, or is attempting to transport sanctioned Russian oil.
While countries that are not major importers of Russian natural gas may receive a “bye” given the bill’s construction, this still leaves numerous trading partners – including China – in the bill’s tariff crosshairs, adding more uncertainty to the global trade environment.
Senate Finance and House Ways & Means’ respective Ranking Members, Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Richard Neal (D-MA), have referred to the S. 5025’s tariff provisions as “a prescription for bedlam.” Indeed, Senator Wyden said last week that he was exploring procedural options to blocking the legislation.[2] Yet Wyden and Neal also said, “there is no question that the U.S. government must take stronger action against purchasers of Russian energy who are fueling the unjustifiable war against Ukraine.”[3]
It’s worthwhile, then, to review a sample of S.5025’s sanctions provisions that go beyond previous sanctions laws or Executive actions.
Sanctions Provisions
The bill codifies sanctions that have been instituted through Executive Orders, including:
a blanket new investment ban in Russia by U.S. persons (section 107).
a prohibition on services to sanctioned financial institutions by international financial messaging systems – with Executive waivers for the economic and foreign policy interests of the United States (Section 110).
It places sanctions on Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear agency, for the first time – previously its subsidiaries and officials had been sanctioned, but not the entity itself.
The bill permits U.S. or foreign financial institutions holding Russian sovereign assets to keep interest due to Russia on those assets. Importantly, the bill does not permit them to keep the interest on assets of blocked persons, which is an important distinction at a time when Russia’s use of its authorities to place Western companies under “external administration” is on the rise.
The bill also provides for exemptions that have been common in the past:
the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance or for humanitarian purposes:
Carrying out or assisting any authorized intelligence or law enforcement activities of the United States.
Compliance with UN and similar obligations:
Civilian nuclear cooperation agreements.
U.S. imports of low-enriched uranium or medical isotopes from Russia.
Official U.S. government business:
Non-Russian oil that transits Russian territory.
U.S. persons operating under the terms of a general license issued by the U.S. Treasury Department before the date of enactment.
Wind-down operations in Russia by non-Russian persons or U.S. persons.
Safety of vessels and crews.
NASA activities.
Whither the Sunset?
Another point of contention that has arisen with S. 5025 is its language that would leave sanctions and tariffs in place for an open-ended run. Specifically, the President has the authority - but is not required - to terminate sanctions, restrictions, or duties in the bill if the President submits a report to Congress certifying in writing that:
Russia has signed a peace agreement accepted by “the free and independent Government of Ukraine” and
has “ceased all military hostilities against and any activities to overthrow, dismantle and subvert the Government of Ukraine.”
This leaves the Executive as the sole decisionmaker regarding the application and termination of the sanctions and tariff provisions.
Looking Ahead
President Trump’s intention to include sanctions against Iran in S. 5025 may complicate support for the bill, but it also may not.
As far as the Congressional calendar is concerned, the current plans are for the House to stay in session through the end of July, and the Senate to be in Washington through the first week of August. That may be sufficient, but there is always September, when Congress will return for a short period, albeit with a packed agenda before the mid-terms. If the bill doesn’t move soon, some argue there won’t be floor time to consider the bill. But the issue of floor time for Russia sanctions bills has never been an obstacle, as noted above – Russia sanctions bills are strong candidates for overwhelming approval, at times with unanimous consent.
With Russia’s economy set to grow only .4% in 2026[4], inflation and interest rates on the rise, and the Central Bank reporting one of the steepest declines in business sentiment in recent years[5], many seem to be hoping that this legislative proposal might push Russia to end its conflict with Ukraine.
To date, no Western sanctions bill or Executive action has changed President Putin’s calculus regarding his designs on Ukraine. Considering that the amount of Russia-China trade conducted in yuan has soared from just 2% in 2022 to more than 90% today[6], it is clear that sanctioning Russia still carries unintended consequences.
But perhaps more concerning is that in its current form, this bill sets dangerous economic and trade powers precedents, which would likely add further strain diplomatic relations and raise costs on an already burdened American public. And it is uncertain whether it would finally entice Russia’s President toward peace.
*Randi B. Levinas is Founder and CEO of Levinas Advisory LLC and is the former EVP and COO of the U.S.-Russia Business Council.
[2] https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/5970400-democrats-oppose-russia-sanctions-act/
[3] Seeking to restore “stability” and “predictability” in U.S. trade policy by putting “Congress back in the driver’s seat,” Senator Wyden introduced legislation on July 22 to eliminate Section 122 and 338 authorities, and require Congressional approval for Section 301, 232 and 201 tariffs.
[4] https://www.reuters.com/business/russia-downgrades-2026-economic-growth-forecast-04-13-deputy-pm-says-2026-05-11/
[5] https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=32705
[6] https://www.forbes.com/sites/zennonkapron/2026/02/22/how-renminbi-internationalization-is-changing/